We also look briefly at why Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin has been given a major role in September parliamentary elections, the jailing of a soldier who threatened to mutiny in a viral video, and the death of longstanding Putin ally Sergei Ivanov.

⏳ This newsletter contains 1,614 words and will take approximately 8 minutes to read. It was translated and edited by Howard Amos.

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Russian President Vladimir Putin made his first public acknowledgement Sunday of the country’s gasoline crisis, which has caused the price of fuel to spike, rationing at gas stations, and huge lines of cars seeking fuel. The format of his intervention was telling: rather than a special address to the nation (something usually reserved for major events like the announcement of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022), or discussing the issue at a government meeting, he gave an interview to Pavel Zarubin, the Kremlin’s “court journalist.” For long sections of the exchange, Putin was obviously reading off a teleprompter.

Responding to one of Zarubin’s pre-agreed questions, Putin admitted that Ukrainian strikes were causing gasoline shortages, but he claimed them were “not critical.” Then, he quickly shifted the topic of conversation from to the state of negotiations over the Ukraine war, and a lengthy account of Russia’s military successes.

Even such an understated acknowledgment of a domestic problem is unusual for Putin, who traditionally prefers to distance himself from bad news. For example, during what were Russia’s then biggest-ever gasoline shortages in September last year, he did not once mention the issue in public.

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The current problem is so severe, however, that Kremlin managers apparently decided Putin would risk looking too detached from reality if he ignored it (they were likely also swayed by Putin’s declining approval ratings, and upcoming parliamentary elections). Apparently, the Kremlin wanted to show that Putin was fully up-to-speed on recent develiopments—as well as portraying Kyiv as solely responsible for lines at gas stations and rising prices.

In other words, the Kremlin is hoping for a “rally around the flag” effect. This is possible. Independent surveys in Russia’s border regions in 2023, for example, found that, as Ukrainian attacks intensified, the share of respondents expressing support for the Kremlin increased. And it’s undeniable that Ukraine’s growing strike campaign inside Russia has led to an increase in civilian casualties (although they remain far below those caused by Russia in Ukraine), which could fuel public anger and strengthen support for the war.

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On the other hand, most Russians do not feel they are in immediate danger. Instead, what concerns people seems to be the deteriorating economic situation. There is not yet any polling data on the gasoline crisis, but criticism of the government is easy to find on Russian social media. This is often summed up by a simple question: “How can a country with some of the world’s largest oil reserves run out of gasoline?” You can also find anger directed at Ukraine, but this appears to be less common.

At this stage, it seems unlikely that gasoline shortages will lead to anti-war protests. In a crisis, most Russians choose adaptation over confrontation—not only individually, but also through grassroots activism. Moscow residents recently created a crowdsourced online map that shows gas stations where fuel was available, and the lines shorter. The information is continuously updated by users. Similar projects have appeared in other Russian regions.

The authorities have encouraged this process, with officials, lawmakers, and pro-government commentators urging Russians to get used to the new reality. As Federation Council Speaker Valentina Matvienko put it: people should stop “wringing their hands.”

How long will the shortages last?

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We also look briefly at gasoline shortages caused by Ukrainian attacks on oil refineries, the passing of urgent legislation to prevent a budget crisis, and the founding congress of the first political party to be set up by Russian émigrés.

⏳ This newsletter contains 1,389 words and will take approximately 8 minutes to read. It was translated and edited by Howard Amos.

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‘Everyone is tired of the war’

The mood in Russia has turned against the conflict in Ukraine in recent months amid a stalemate at the front and Kyiv’s increasingly successful drone attacks, according to our sources in Moscow. Secret polling commissioned by Russian officials and shared with Vlast indicates more and more Russians want a ceasefire.

There is no single reason for this fatigue, but it seems to have been fueled by economic difficulties, the failure of negotiations with Washington, intensifying wartime repressions, a lack of progress at the front, and fears about mobilization. Perhaps most dramatically, Ukrainian attacks on Russian cities have been increasingly successful, with the biggest-ever strike on Moscow on Thursday setting ablaze an oil refinery.

There have been several signals from the Russian elite that they want an end to the conflict.

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In this Vlast newsletter we look at:

• Why Kremlin managers believe “re-activating” Putin in recent months will help to boost his image and reverse his sliding poll ratings;

• Whether Russia is heading for a fiscal crisis driven by ever-growing defense spending.

We also briefly examine United Russia’s selection of Ukraine war veterans to stand in September parliamentary elections, and gasoline shortages in annexed Crimea.

⏳This newsletter contains 2,234 words and will take about 11 minutes to read. It was translated and edited by Howard Amos.

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How is Putin trying to turn around his falling approval ratings?

After a noticeable absence from the public eye in early 2026, there has been an increase in the number of Putin’s public appearances, including trips to China and Kazakhstan.

There has been an uptick in President Vladimir Putin’s public appearances in recent months as Kremlin managers try to burnish his image and stop a steady decline in support. According to Vlast’s calculations, Putin was seen in public 60 times in April and May—more than the previous three months combined.

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In March, Vlast was the first outlet to report that Putin had scaled back his public activity, and almost entirely stopped traveling outside of Moscow. In January, February, and March, Putin appeared in public 25 percent fewer times than the same period last year, and 50 percent fewer than in 2024. His absence was particularly noticeable amid an unusually strong wave of public discontent fueled by intensifying online restrictions.

However, as data from Russian polling agencies began to show a steady slide in Putin’s approval ratings earlier this year, a decision was taken that Putin needed to work on his image. This is an old PR trick used by Kremlin political managers, who believe showing Putin surrounded by adoring crowds, foreign leaders, and deferential officials help dispel doubts about his capabilities, and boost his popularity.

For example, in the aftermath of the rebellion by mercenary leader Yevgeny Prigozhin in 2023, Putin was seen meeting people on the streets of the North Caucasus republic of Dagestan. Each of Putin’s public appearances are, of course, covered extensively—and positively—by state-owned media.

In recent months, Putin’s efforts to be more visible have been hard to miss. Most notably, the Kremlin organized two encounters for Putin that were supposed to showcase his closeness to ordinary people, as well as his human side. One of them was a meeting with his 92-year-old high school German teacher, Vera Gurevich. The Kremlin released a video of Putin picking up Gurevich from a hotel in downtown Moscow and driving her to the Kremlin for dinner. Wearing jeans and carrying flowers, Putin was shown hugging and kissing his former teacher (of course, next to the 92-year-old woman, the 73-year-old president appeared particularly youthful). According to Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov, the encounter brought Putin “the joy of simple human interaction.” The second such meeting was with a young Chinese man who had first encountered Putin as a boy in 2000.

Just as Putin has been more visible inside Russia, so he has also taken more foreign trips. In May, he went to China and Kazakhstan. Although both visits were light on substance, they generated lots of photo ops, and news coverage on state-owned media.

While the necessity of a trip to China is difficult to dispute (Moscow is heavily dependent on Beijing’s support amid the war in Ukraine), it was clearly not essential for Putin to go to Kazakhstan. Indeed, this trip may have been specifically requested by the Kremlin to convince Russians that Putin remains in demand on the international stage. Notably, the trip to Kazakhstan was a state visit (the second in less than a year) with all the attendant pomp and ceremony.

Nevertheless, despite Putin’s recent “activization,” the number of times that he has been seen in public in 2026 remains lower than previous years. Between January and June, Putin took part in 22 percent fewer public events than the same period last year, and up to 34 percent fewer than in both 2024 and the pre-pandemic year of 2019.

Putin also continues to shun Russia’s regions. In the first five months of this year, he left Moscow only twice—both times to go to St. Petersburg. In comparison, in the same period last year he made eight regional trips, in 2024 he made 14, and in 2019 he went on 17. The last time Putin publicly visited a Russian region (not counting St. Petersburg) was when he went to the Volga River region of Samara in November.

We arrived at the numbers for Putin’s public appearances by counting press releases and transcripts published by the Kremlin. We did not include pre-recorded bilateral meetings—so-called “canned” events—which are released weeks, or months, after they take place (helping create the impression Putin is always busy). Even if “canned” events are included, Putin attended 14 percent fewer events this year, and 23 percent fewer than 2024.

Have the Kremlin’s efforts helped Putin’s ratings?

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The dominance of Chinese cars in Russia has become a symbol of how life has changed since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

To mark President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Beijing this week, we are looking at the ongoing ‘China-fication’ of the Russian economy. Has China really replaced Europe as Russia’s main trading partner? Is the Kremlin losing revenue as it pivots eastward? What exactly do Russia and China trade?

We also look briefly at a massive Ukrainian drone attack on Moscow; the Kremlin’s decision to replace the popular governor of the “frontline” Belgorod Region, and an exceptionally gloomy official economic forecast.

⏳ This newsletter contains 1,882 words and will take about 10 minutes to read. It was translated and edited by Howard Amos.

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The China-fication of Russia’s economy

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Beijing this week—his first foreign trip in 2026—did not generate much real news. The Kremlin published Wednesday two lengthy joint declarations that were light on substance: one about deepening ties; the other about the emergence of a multipolar world. There was also an announcement that Putin would visit China in November for an Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum.

During his visit, Putin heaped compliments on Chinese leader Xi Jinping, and stressed that Russia-China relations were critical for global stability. None of this was surprising: the Russian leader has a genuine reason to be grateful to China. Amid the war in Ukraine and the subsequent tightening of Western sanctions, it was China that stepped in to help. The value of trade between the two countries last year hit a record high of $228 billion (double what it was in 2019), according to Chinese customs data.

In effect, China has replaced the EU, which accounted for 40 percent of Russia’s foreign trade before the war. This becomes clearer when you look at the structure of Russian trade. Although total volumes have not changed much since 2021, the value of trade with EU countries has fallen by over $220 billion; while trade with China has grown by $117 billion. The remaining $100 billion or so has been distributed among other countries, including India and ex-Soviet states that serve as hubs for the re-export of Western goods into Russia.

What does Russia sell to China? Russia exports slightly more to China than it imports. That was true before the war, and remains true today. Since 2019, Russian exports have doubled: from $61 billion to $124.1 billion. Russia supplies China with metals products, timber, fish and seafood, fertilizers, but roughly half the total value of exports is oil and gas.

Although Europe was traditionally Russia’s main market for energy exports, the EU decision to reduce purchases after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine meant the Kremlin increased raw material exports to Asia, primarily China and India (partly by using its “shadow fleet”). Since 2022, the value of Russian energy exports to China has risen over 40 percent. At the end of last year, Russia was China’s largest supplier of both natural gas (24 percent of the market) and oil (17 percent). China is currently the largest buyer of Russian gas and oil.

However, this pivot to the East has not come cheap. Unlike Europe, China purchases raw materials at a discount to global prices. According to calculations by Moscow’s Gaidar Institute, China’s discount on Russian oil was 15 percent in 2022. This subsequently declined, but again rose above 10 percent last year following new U.S. energy sanctions.

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• The significance of Putin’s growing unpopularity and why you should be wary of lurid claims in Western media;

• State-owned Russian Railways, one of the country’s most important companies, has slashed its investment program and is struggling with over $47 billion of debt.

We also examine scaled-back Victory Day celebrations, the unprecedented flight of a deputy minister to the United States, and recent data that shows Russia has not yet had a significant financial windfall from the Iran war.

⏳This newsletter contains 2,206 words and will take about 11 minutes to read. It was translated and edited by Howard Amos.

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Putin’s sliding popularity is significant—but not critical

While it’s true that the Russian regime is facing a level of stress not seen for several years, alarmist predictions being aired in Western media are wide of the mark.

In recent days, Western media have been filled with a series of lurid articles suggesting the Russian regime is bedevilled by an unprecedented level of infighting—and even that President Vladimir Putin’s days in power might be numbered.

Some of the reporting has been based on a report from an unidentified European security agency, with CNN on Thursday headlining an article: “Unsettled Kremlin tightens security around Putin amid assassinations and coup fears, intel report says.” The Washington Post published an article Wednesday that cited a source claiming there is a “divide in the upper reaches of Kremlin power,” and a commentator on a Sky News podcast suggested that “If Putin’s not careful, the country could snap.”

But does this sort of reporting reflect the real state of affairs in the Kremlin? While it’s difficult to judge the veracity of briefings by unidentified European security officials (or their motivations for speaking out now), it’s true that Putin’s approval ratings have been falling in recent weeks. This is undeniably significant.

The Public Opinion Foundation (FOM), whose main client is the Kremlin, said last week that 73 percent of respondents believe Putin is doing a “rather good” job, the lowest figure since 2022. Independent pollster Levada Center said on May 30 that Putin’s approval rating has fallen steadily for six months, reaching 79 percent in April, the first time it has been below 80 percent since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. And Kremlin-run polling center VTsIOM said last month that Putin’s support had fallen for 7 weeks in a row to just 65.6 percent.

To an outside observer, these numbers might look extraordinarily high (in contrast, 78 percent of Germans disapprove of the German chancellor, and 62 percent of those in the United States disapprove of President Donald Trump). But authoritarian Russia functions very differently from Western democracies.

Putin’s popularity is not only the pulse of the Russian system, it’s an important indicator of political stability. Officials at all levels strive to boost the president’s rating, which is considered tantamount to a matter of national security. Crucially, no other politician is allowed to get more popular than Putin. For example, when Khabarovsk region governor Sergei Furgal’s approval ratings surpassed Putin’s, he was jailed.

And it’s noticeable that the Kremlin has recently been taking steps to burnish Putin’s image—a sure sign of concern. After several months of rarely appearing in public, Putin suddenly became very active last week, including meetings with what Kremlin political managers call “different social groups” (including athletes, and indigenous peoples).

Why are Putin’s ratings declining? Firstly, people are unhappy with the economic situation. To finance military spending, the authorities have had to raise taxes and crack down on tax evasion. At the same time, interest rates remain high because the Central Bank is pursuing a tight monetary policy to combat inflation. As a result, economic growth and household income growth slowed significantly last year. Secondly, war fatigue is growing. There were hopes for an end to the fighting and a return to normal life after Trump returned to the White House in 2025—but these have been dashed. Finally, online restrictions and internet shutdowns have caused widespread anger.

Is the regime under threat? This is the key question. The European security agency report apparently suggested that Putin was more and more fearful of a coup. But it seems unlikely that coup plotters in Russia would be informing European spies of their intentions (or that European spies would want to warn Putin of a plot).

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• Why mild criticism of President Vladimir Putin by celebrity blogger Victoriya Bonya got such an extraordinary response from the Russian political elite;

• The detention of top managers at Russia’s biggest publishing house and what it says about growing pressure on the book market.

We also examine Putin’s first public expression of approval for the rehabilitation of Soviet-era spymaster Felix Dzerzhsinky, and ongoing discussions about a windfall tax.

⏳This newsletter contains 2244 words and will take about 11 minutes to read. It was translated and edited by Howard Amos.

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Russia’s political class obsesses over blogger’s Putin criticism

Not only did criticism of Putin by Monaco-based blogger Victoriya Bonya go viral with over 30 million views, it was taken seriously by top regime figures.

Despite the ongoing wars in Ukraine and Iran, the last ten days have seen Russia’s political class consumed by the fallout from a viral video post by a celebrity blogger that leveled criticism at President Vladimir Putin. The extraordinary response from both ordinary Russians and prominent political figures not only reflects the country’s warped political landscape, where opposition voices have been ruthlessly purged, but the entire system’s growing instability.

“Vladimir Vladimirovich [Putin], people are afraid of you. The public is afraid, bloggers and artists are afraid, governors are afraid. But you are the president of our country. I think we shouldn’t be afraid,” Victoriya Bonya said in the 18-minute video posted last week to Instagram that has since amassed more than 30 million views, and 85,000 comments.

Bonya, 46, rose to fame when she participated in Dom-2, the Russian equivalent of reality shows like Big Brother or Love Island, in the mid-2000s, and she is one of the last people you would expect to be making political waves. She lives a luxurious life in Monaco, and sells cosmetics and clothing via Instagram, where she has 13.6 million followers and regularly posts scantily-clad photos. Last year, she climbed Everest.

The apolitical blogger’s mild criticism was quickly taken up by Russian politicians including the Communist Party’s aging leader Gennady Zyuganov, and it received unusual public replies from regime heavyweights including Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov, and State Duma speaker Vyacheslav Volodin. It was also commented on by propagandist Vladimir Solovyov, journalist Ksenia Sobchak (who also became famous through Dom-2), a string of parliamentary deputies, and dozens of influential pro-war bloggers.

The fact that it went viral not only suggests there is significant discontent in Russia, but that traditional channels of communication with officials are no longer functioning as they once did. It’s also a testament to how Putin is distracted from day-to-day politics by the war in Ukraine, and is too busy (or too uninterested) to engage with bread-and-butter issues.

In her video, Bonya raised five critical topics that, she said, were a cause of worry for Russians: flooding in the North Caucasus region of Dagestan, an oil spill in the Black Sea, the culling of livestock in Siberia, internet restrictions, and the killing of endangered animals. She claimed that “real” information does not reach Putin, and that there is a “wall” between him and the masses.

Video appeals to Putin are a common genre in Russia’s personalized autocracy, where there is no independent judiciary or media—and criticism of the authorities can lead to a prison sentence. In most cases, such appeals are a sign of desperation.

Notably, Bonya said nothing about the war in Ukraine; nor did she criticize Putin directly, Instead, she said she supported the Russian leader, and that he was a “strong politician.” She subsequently distanced herself from independent Russian outlets, which had sent her inquiries about follow-up interviews, saying: “I am not a traitor; I am with the people.”

As Bonya’s address garnered millions of views, Putin’s spokesman Peskov gave an unexpectedly conciliatory—and substantive—response. Three days after her outburst, he said that the issues Bonya raised were “resonant” and that “work is being done on them.” Bonya then posted another video in tears, expressing her gratitude.

The “Bonya effect” did not end there. Speaking in parliament on Wednesday, Zyuganov expressed his support for Bonya and warned that, if the Kremlin did not heed her words, there could be a revolution. When Volodin joined the debate he was more critical. Without mentioning Bonya, he called on everyone to “stop supporting those who left the country in difficult times and are shaping hostility toward us.” For their part, pro-Kremlin bloggers accused Bonya of being a hired shill. Her main public opponent became propagandist Vladimir Solovyov, who gave an insulting tirade about her on his radio show.

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On Thursday, April 23, at 17:00 CET / 11:00 EST, Farida Rustamova, Margarita Liutova, and Howard Amos will host a Substack livestream. Save the date!

We will be happy to talk on any topic: from the fallout from the war in Ukraine, to divisive internet restrictions, a stuttering economy, and Putin’s increasing secretiveness.

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• How the FSB’s pursuit of total control over the Russian internet has caused serious disagreements in the elite, risking a political backlash.

• Desperate to find more revenue, officials are mulling whether to impose taxes on an innovative and extremely popular instant payment network.

We also examine police raids on the Moscow offices of Novaya Gazeta, and why Putin allowed famous icons from a museum to be transferred to the Orthodox Church.

⏳This newsletter contains 2,164 words and will take about 10 minutes to read. It was translated and edited by Howard Amos.

Putin sides with FSB amid anger over internet restrictions

The blocking of Telegram, a campaign against VPNs, and internet shutdowns have complicated the lives of bureaucrats, and caused business people to lose money.

At a Saturday morning meeting last month, executives from Russia’s largest telecom operators and internet companies were surprised to be handed a document by Digital Minister Maksut Shadayev, who was accompanied by an unidentified officer from the Federal Security Services (FSB). They were told to sign immediately. According to journalist Maria Kolomychenko, the document obliged their companies to stop working with clients who are using Virtual Private Networks (VPN) to evade internet restrictions—a common practice in Russia, where hundreds of major internet platforms and media outlets are blocked.

The executives were outraged by the request, and went to the press. Their willingness to brief journalists attested to the depth of their anger—after all, it has long been taboo for members of the elite to air their dirty laundry in public.

“Everyone is against [more internet restrictions] except one agency,” said a high-ranking source close to the government, referring to the FSB. “My teenage children complain: ‘Come to your senses, what are you doing?’” said another source close to the government.

The incident with Shadayev is a good illustration of the extent of the unhappiness within the elite—among both business leaders who are losing money, and officials who have far fewer tools to influence public opinion. The issue has come to the fore in recent months as the FSB seems to be in a hurry to destroy Russia’s remaining elements of free internet, blocking popular messaging app Telegram, cracking down on VPNs, and extending mobile internet blackouts.

The anger in Russia’s business elite, which is losing billions of dollars, is particularly intense. And matters have been made worse by the Kremlin’s refusal to engage in discussions.

“High-quality internet is a matter of national competitiveness. Without it, your country is cut off from global progress,” complained a source close to the leadership of a big Russian IT company.

At a meeting with the country’s wealthiest businessmen last month, the issue of internet blackouts was raised with Putin. The head of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (the so-called “oligarchs union”) told Putin that shutdowns had made life harder for businesses, as well as ordinary people, and asked for a solution. Putin sidestepped the question. At a subsequent closed-door meeting, he also failed to offer an explanation, and made no promises, according to two Vlast sources who had knowledge of the gathering.

At the same time, Russian officials are irritated about being obliged to abandon Telegram and move their public communications to MAX, a messaging app developed by a Russian company close to the security services. All state employees will soon be legally required to use MAX for work communications.

However, the two government sources and another ten sources across government agencies and state companies told Vlast that state employees and politicians have been buying new phones and “clean” SIM cards solely to use MAX.

Others are still holding out hope that a compromise solution will be found. A source from a federal agency said that no one wants to lose Telegram: “Everyone hopes [Telegram founder Pavel] Durov will come up with something to bypass the restrictions, or that the problem will somehow resolve itself.”

Just like business executives leaking to the press, dissatisfaction among officials has also spilled over into the public sphere. The governor of Belgorod region, which borders Ukraine, complained last month that, unlike Telegram, MAX does not have push notifications, which means local residents will not be able to get timely alerts about incoming Ukrainian missiles and drones.

Russian political parties (which express some token opposition but are ultimately loyal to the Kremlin) are well aware of the public anger about the internet restrictions, and have spoken out about the blocking of Telegram—apparently seeking to boost their popularity ahead of parliamentary elections in September. The New People party, which was created by the Kremlin to channel liberal votes, has been the most outspoken. But there has also been criticism from the Communist Party, Just Russia, and the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (which expelled a State Duma deputy whose active role in the debate made it look as if the party was in favor).

Notably, the popularity of New People reached an all-time high Friday, according to state-owned pollster VTsIOM. A total 12.3 percent of those surveyed by VTsIOM said they would vote for New People in elections, up 1.5 percentage points from a week earlier (a significant jump). Support for the ruling party, United Russia, has been falling in recent months, currently standing at a five-year low of 29.7 percent.

Putin’s influential deputy chief of staff Sergei Kiriyenko, who oversees domestic politics, has made no public statement about the restrictions—but many suspect he is unhappy at being deprived of Telegram (a key tool of communication), and worried that public anger could complicate the State Duma elections at which he is expected to deliver a comprehensive victory for United Russia. Tellingly, Kiriyenko seems to have allowed the expressions of dissent from political parties (as long as there is no direct criticism of Putin or the FSB). It’s also significant that the Central Election Commission has given permission for campaigning to take place on Telegram.

It seems possible that the FSB is seeking to establish total control over the internet before the formal start to campaigning in the State Duma elections in June. The high-ranking source close to the government said that the FSB is particularly powerful during wartime, and, if the fighting in Ukraine ended, the FSB might have to give up its desire for such total control. “They [the FSB] are pushing because there won’t be another opportunity,” he said.

All Vlast’s government sources said it’s impossible for anyone within the system to really oppose the FSB. The spy agency is adept at manipulating the internet-illiterate Putin, who tends to trust their recommendations—particularly in wartime.

Our sources believe there is only one development that could change Putin’s mind: if Russia’s token opposition parties (particularly the Communists) see a significant rise in their popularity. If that happens, one source suggested, Kremlin officials could show Putin the alarming polling numbers, and successfully propose a compromise.

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Analysis in brief

Police carried out searches Thursday at the Moscow offices of Novaya Gazeta, one of the few independent media outlets still operating in Russia (the newspaper’s editor-in-chief, Dmitry Muratov, received the 2021 Nobel Peace Prize). The search lasted 12 hours, and investigative journalist Oleg Roldugin was detained. Until last year, Roldugin was editor-in-chief of the Russian weekly journal Sobesednik, which was occasionally critical of the authorities.

Putin gave permission last week for the transfer of two famous icons to the Russian Orthodox Church. The Vladimir icon (a masterpiece of 12th-century Byzantine painting) and the Donskaya icon (from the 14th century), which are both considered miracle-working by the Russian Orthodox Church, were moved from Moscow’s Tretyakov Gallery to the Cathedral of Christ the Savior. This was the second such transfer since the start of the full-scale war in Ukraine (the first was the 15th-century Trinity icon painted by Andrei Rublev in 2023).

Patriarch Kirill said Saturday that he had asked Putin to authorize the transfer, and that people should now pray before these icons “for our Fatherland, for our Orthodox President Vladimir Vladimirovich, for the authorities, for the army, that the Lord may protect our Fatherland and not allow those who wish evil upon our country to achieve their goals.” Art historian Elizaveta Likhacheva told the BBC Russian Service this week that the move is a sign of “magical thinking” within some in Putin’s inner circle, who believe that religious devotion can help Russia prevail in the Ukraine war.

Russia looks to tap $1.3 trillion instant payment network

If the Finance Ministry decides to go ahead and levy taxes on transactions in the popular Faster Payments System (FPS), it could affect millions of ordinary people.

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Our newsletter is getting a makeover! This has been a long time in the coming, but it has taken so many months because we wanted to get it right. We believe that high-quality content deserves a high-quality brand.

With this step, we hope our reporting will be more accessible to those interested in understanding the secretive Russian regime.

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• A big fall in the number of public appearances by the Russian leader in 2026, and why this might lead to political problems;

• A push to force universities to recruit 2 percent of their students for the military— particularly the country’s newly-created drone forces.

We also highlight data showing the Russian economy continues to stagnate, and how payouts to student mothers are supposed to help solve Russia’s demographic problem.

This newsletter contains 1667 words and will take about 8 minutes to read. It was translated and edited by Howard Amos.

Putin’s public appearances drop 24% in last 3 months

The Russian leader’s preference for geopolitics and closed-door meetings could end up increasing the political risks facing the regime.

The number of times Russian President Vladimir Putin has appeared in public was significantly down in the first three months of this year, according to a tally by Vlast. The noticeable absence is likely to not only be the result of Putin’s obsession with geopolitics—particularly the war in Ukraine—but also a desire to avoid association with unpopular domestic issues, and a growing preference for secrecy.

In the first three months of this year, Putin has taken part in just 54 public meetings and events—compared to 71 in the same period last year. In 2024, he attended 107 public events, but this number was so high partly because of campaigning in the run-up to presidential elections in March. Before the full-scale war in Ukraine and the coronavirus epidemic, Putin also tended to participate in more public events (for example, in 2019, he was seen 87 times in the first three months of the year).

We reached these numbers by counting the press releases and transcripts on the Kremlin website. We did not include pre-recorded bilateral meetings—so-called “canned” events—that are often released weeks, or even months, after they take place (this helps create the illusion that Putin, 73, is always hard at work). Even if you do include the “canned” events, though, Putin has still attended 20 percent fewer public events this year.

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• Why are Russian officials so careful when talking about the conflict?

• Will Putin follow through on new threats against Europe?

• Can higher oil prices solve Russia’s economic problems?

We also look at unprecedented internet blackouts in Moscow, the arrest of (yet another) ex-deputy defense minister, an unusual mistake by the Kremlin’s press service, and whether the Russian capital is really experiencing financial difficulties.

⏳ This newsletter contains 1866 words and will take about 9 minutes to read. It was translated and edited by Howard Amos.

Kremlin wary not to alienate Trump with Iran war criticism

Russian President Vladimir Putin and other senior Russian officials have been extremely cautious when talking publicly about the conflict in the Middle East. Indeed, the Kremlin’s communications strategy could be summarized as: “repeat that Russia is a strategic partner of Iran, and avoid criticism of the U.S. leadership.”

Since the start of the U.S.-Israeli operation, Russia has only once explicitly criticized Washington. That was in a condolence message Putin sent to Iran after the killing of the country’s head of state, Ali Khamenei, in which he described the assassination as a “cynical violation of all norms of human morality and international law.” We don’t know whether Putin was similarly critical during a phone call with Trump on Monday, but it seems very unlikely. The Kremlin’s official statement following the call was conciliatory.

Although Iran is a Russian ally, and has provided the Russian military with drones for the war in Ukraine, two senior Russian officials told Faridaily that Putin does not want to risk angering Trump. In other words, Putin will put his personal relationship with the U.S. leader before any rhetorical assistance for Iran.

After all, Putin is a pragmatist. He understands that Trump’s presidency is an opportunity for Russia to win the war with Ukraine, said one of the sources, who is close to the Kremlin. “A war with Ukrainians to the bitter end would be an extremely negative, even catastrophic, outcome for Russia,” he added. Putin will continue engaging with Trump over Ukraine despite the war in the Middle East, added the second source.

At the same time, the public caution of Russian officials does not mean the Kremlin has frozen out Iran entirely. After all, Russia and Iran signed a strategic partnership agreement in 2025 that specified intelligence sharing and military consultation.

U.S. media outlets have reported over the last week that Moscow is providing Tehran with information (particularly satellite imagery) about the movements of U.S. troops, ships and aircraft in the Middle East. The Kremlin has declined to comment on the reports, and Trump has said he has no confirmation that this is the case.

Either way, it’s likely that, while the Trump-Putin relationship is the Kremlin’s priority, Russian officials also see the Iran war as presenting some opportunities. The two sources both highlighted a belief that the war in Iran was a step toward the sort of new world order Putin has been seeking.

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New threats to Europe

While wary of criticizing the U.S. and Israel, Putin has been far less restrained when it comes to Europe. In particular, he instructed the Russian government last week to assess the feasibility of an “early termination” of natural gas supplies to European countries (except Hungary and Slovakia). The word “early” here is a reference to the European Union’s full ban on Russian LNG and gas imports due to be implemented in 2027.

Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak later said that Russia was looking at re-directing supplies to China, India, Thailand, and the Philippines. If Russia did halt gas supplies, it would be a major blow to European energy markets. According to Eurostat, Russia provides about 16 percent of Europe’s LNG imports and 13 percent of the EU’s total gas supplies.

However, according to Faridaily’s sources, Putin’s threats should not be taken seriously. Above all, an end to gas supplies to Europe would inflict a major financial blow on Russia. One source said that Putin’s comments were just an attempt to push gas prices higher—adding to the pressure on European capitals amid the Iran war.

Higher oil prices will not solve Russia’s economic problems

The rise in oil prices triggered by the fighting in Iran will inevitably mean a financial windfall for the Kremlin. How much money Russia makes, though, will depend on how long the fighting continues, and whether oil prices remain elevated.

The nature of Russia’s tax system means we won’t have the data to calculate the Iran war windfall in March for a number of weeks. Instead, we can only make an educated guess.

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• Why the Kremlin has decided to shut down Moscow’s Gulag History Museum and replace it with one pushing a propaganda narrative about World War II;

• The problems faced by Ukraine war veterans and what the Kremlin is doing to try help them re-integrate into society.

We also highlight data suggesting further labor market weakening, the nationalization of a major ball-bearing factory, and increasing pressure against Telegram founder Pavel Durov.

⏳ This newsletter contains 2217 words—it will take about 11 minutes to read.

Translated and edited by Howard Amos.

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Gulag museum closure a watershed moment

The shuttering of the widely-praised, state-owned Gulag History Museum highlights the ever-growing influence of Russia’s security services.

Moscow City Hall announced last week that the capital’s Gulag History Museum will be shut down after nearly 20 years of commemorating the darkest page of Soviet history. In its place, a museum will be opened about Nazi crimes during World War II, and the so-called “genocide of the Soviet people.” In keeping with the times, it will be headed by a veteran of the war in Ukraine.

The Gulag History Museum was the only major state-run institution commemorating Stalinist repression, and its replacement by a museum promoting a propagandistic interpretation of World War II is a pivotal moment in Russia’s cultural and political life that vividly illustrates the dominance of the security services, and their ultraconservative political allies. Yan Rachinsky, chairman of veteran human rights and history organization Memorial, said the closure was like “spitting on the graves of the victims of state terror,” and a shameless bid to “destroy memory that is inconvenient for the current government.”

The first indication of problems for the Gulag History Museum came in late 2024 when its work was suspended under the pretext of “fire safety violations.” According to our sources (and reporting by The Moscow Times), this was ordered by the Kremlin, and the Federal Security Service (FSB). The trigger was apparently a “Prayer of Memory” at which participants read aloud the names of victims of repression. A similar event, “Returning the Names,” was previously organized by Memorial prior to the organization’s ban in 2021.

Neither Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin, nor City Hall (which formally owns the museum) have commented in detail on last week’s announcement. They simply published a press release describing the new Museum of Memory.

The source also said Kremlin aide Vladimir Medinsky, a former culture minister and participant in Ukraine ceasefire negotiations, played a key role in the decision. Medinsky heads the Russian Military Historical Society (RMHS), an influential historical propaganda group that has helped establish several museums about the “genocide of the Soviet people” in World War II.

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The Gulag History Museum was set-up by City Hall in 2001, and the first head of the museum was dissident Anton Antonov-Ovseenko, who spent a total of 13 years in Soviet camps and prisons. Under Sobyanin (whose grandfather was repressed in 1937), the museum was moved from its original home in a converted apartment near the Kremlin into a newly-renovated four-storey building. Under its second director, Roman Romanov, it became a rare example of a internationally-renowned Russian state-owned museum, with some journalists comparing it to Berlin’s famous Jewish Museum. In 2021, it was awarded the Council of Europe Museum Prize for institutions making a significant contribution to the “understanding of European cultural heritage,” and “the promotion of respect for human rights and democracy.”

The museum that will open on the vacated site will be much more in line with the Kremlin’s view of the past. In recent years, Russia has heavily promoted the idea of a “genocide of the Soviet people,” an entirely new concept. Historian Konstantin Pakhaliuk, who was dismissed from the RMHS in 2023, has said that the idea helps counter-balance the belief that the Soviet Union helped to start World War II. “It allows them to say: ‘We are the main victors in this war, and we are also the main victims’,” Pakhaliuk said.

Russian President Vladimir Putin first mentioned this “genocide” in July 2020. In October 2022, a Russian court designated the siege of Leningrad as genocide, and, last year, Russia passed a law “On Perpetuating the Memory of the Victims of the Genocide of the Soviet People.” Now, the State Duma looks set to approve legislation that would make publicly denying the “genocide of the Soviet people” a crime punishable by up to five years in prison.

Since he came to power, Putin’s views of Stalin, who presided over the murder and imprisonment of millions of Russians, have evolved. In the early 2000s, Russian officials generally avoided open praise of the brutal leader, and even occasionally leveled criticism. Putin met repeatedly with Alexander Solzhenitsyn, who wrote The Gulag Archipelago, before the author’s death in 2008. And, as recently as 2017, Putin attended the unveiling of the “Wall of Sorrow,” a memorial to victims of political repression in downtown Moscow.

However, much has changed since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Most of the estimated 131 monuments to Stalin erected in Russia under Putin have appeared amidst the fighting, and the first such Stalin statue in Moscow was put up in the metro last year. The Kremlin’s position on the Gulag History Museum was expressed on Wednesday by Putin adviser Valery Fadeev, who heads the Presidential Commission on Commemorating Victims of Political Repression (which last met in 2019). “Some [security officials] are beginning to think the topic of repression is being used by Russia’s enemies,” Fadeev told Kommersant newspaper.

Despite appearances, the Kremlin has not yet completely renounced the idea of honoring the memory of Soviet-era victims of political terror. But, as present-day repression intensifies, the topic is increasingly awkward. It’s far easier to focus on erasing “negative” memories, and promote a creeping rehabilitation of Stalin.

Analysis in brief

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• The Kremlin’s decision to allow people to meet with Putin without spending several days in quarantine (a Faridaily exclusive!);

• Is a banking crisis really already underway in Russia?

We also briefly examine the attempted assassination of the deputy head of Russian military intelligence, a 50 percent fall in Russian oil-and-gas revenues in January, and how Moscow is stepping up pressure on WhatsApp, Telegram, and YouTube.

⏳ This newsletter contains 1944 words—it will take about 10 minutes to read.

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Kremlin (finally) scraps quarantine for Putin meetings

In wartime Russia, face-to-face meetings with the president are an extremely important political commodity—and they’re now easier to obtain.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has stopped demanding that all those he meets are quarantined in advance, four sources with knowledge of Kremlin protocol told Faridaily. Quarantine measures for the Russian leader were introduced in 2020 amid the coronavirus epidemic, and they have been strictly enforced by the Federal Guard Service (FSO).

Known to be careful with his health, Putin, 73, was the only head of state to impose such a strict coronavirus quarantine—and maintain it for so long. Government ministers, heads of state-owned companies, and billionaires have all had to put their lives on hold and stay in specially designated isolation facilities if they wanted to meet the Russian leader.

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• What we know about the Council of Europe’s attempt to establish an official organ to represent the exiled, anti-Putin Russian opposition.

• Why Russia’s domestic aviation manufacturing industry has failed to produce a single plane in 2025.

We also look briefly at the repeated destruction of a memorial to murdered journalist Anna Politkovskaya, some angry reactions to a jump in inflation, and the sale of one of Russia’s biggest airports to a longtime friend of Putin.

⏳ This newsletter contains 2123 words—it will take about 10 minutes to read.

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The exiled Russian opposition’s first ‘official’ institution

The establishment of a Council of Europe platform for Russia’s democratic, anti-Putin opposition has raised questions about transparency, and legitimacy.

European officials have often complained privately in recent years about the fragmentation, infighting, and competing agendas of Russia’s exiled opposition. In a bid to address this problem, the Council of Europe announced Monday it had chosen 15 delegates for its “Platform for Dialogue with Russian Democratic Forces” that it hopes will “strengthen Russian democratic forces to carry out democratic change in Russia and achieve a lasting and just peace in Ukraine.”

How were delegates chosen? Exiled Russian opposition groups could not agree on holding a vote for members to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) platform, and were unable to come up with an agreed list of representatives—effectively shifting the political responsibility for the composition of the platform onto PACE.

The resulting selection procedure was controversial, and opaque. The resolution establishing the platform, which was passed by PACE in October, contained no details about the process. Nor were any released subsequently. Apparently, PACE simply collected applications sent to a Proton email inbox. A total of 209 applications were received, one Russian opposition figure told Faridaily (he himself was not included in the delegation). He claimed: “There was no filtering on the Russian side.”

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While there is little to indicate Witkoff will be able to strike a deal this time, growing economic headwinds for Moscow seem to make peace more likely in the long term. The Finance Ministry released preliminary budget data Monday laying bare Russia’s financial problems as the war approaches its fifth year.

🛢 Oil-and-gas revenues far lower than expected

Revenue from producing and selling oil and gas was 22 percent below what was predicted last year in the planning of the budget, and 24 percent lower than the year before (2024).

There are two reasons for this. Firstly, oil prices were lower than expected. Not only did prices fall, but Western sanctions meant Russia was obliged to sell crude even cheaper (mostly to India and China). As a result, the price of Russian oil fell below $40 a barrel in the second half of the year, even though Russia’s spending plans in last year’s budget had assumed it would be worth $60 a barrel.

Secondly, a stronger ruble. Russia’s currency was among the strongest in the world last year. The ruble was supported by a significant trade surplus, low capital outflow due to sanctions, and high interest rates. We previously looked in detail at the reasons for the ruble’s strength here.

⚙️ Non-oil-and-gas revenue also down (albeit not as much)

Non-oil-and-gas revenue was slightly down, but this was less concerning for the Kremlin. As the government has repeatedly raised taxes in recent years, non-oil-and-gas revenue has been growing, and 2025 was no exception: up 12.6 percent year-on-year. At the same time, the total amount collected was still below the official target.

🔁 Revenue mix shifts to a record low for oil-and-gas

The split last year was 23 percent oil-and-gas revenue, and 77 percent non-oil-and-gas. There is Finance Ministry data on the split going back to 2006, and this is the lowest the oil-and-gas share has ever been. Over the last two years it has hovered about 30 percent, and before 2014 it went as high as 50 percent.

📈 High spending resulted in a large deficit

With revenue below expectations, and expenditure a bit higher, Russia recorded a substantial deficit of 5.6 trillion rubles (2.6 percent of GDP) last year. It was covered mainly through an increase in government debt. Even so, sovereign debt remains extremely low (at around 17% GDP).

What conclusions can we draw?

• Russia has become less dependent on oil-and-gas revenue, but the Kremlin is unlikely to be happy that this is occurring in wartime. Falling oil-and-gas revenue combined with economic stagnation means the option to dramatically increase state spending—like in the early years of the war—is off the table.

  According to calculations by the respected Tverdie Tsifry Telegram channel, if oil prices, and the value of the ruble, remain at current levels, the deficit this year will be 3.5 trillion rubles ($45 billion). That is a huge amount—almost half the Kremlin’s annual spending on pensions and social benefits.

• Through financial tweaks (like raising some taxes and increasing borrowing) and using reserves in the National Wealth Fund, Russia can maintain its current high level of military spending for several more years. However, this would mean there is not enough money for infrastructure development, and human capital.

  The Finance Ministry believes the era of ultra-high oil-and-gas revenue is now at an end. The government last month published their budget forecasts through 2042. According to these figures, the share of oil-and-gas revenue in the budget will gradually fall to 13 percent.

• Russia’s finances are not in great shape, and Putin cannot ignore economic reality as he engages in peace negotiations. It’s obvious that the war is draining resources not only from Ukraine, but also from Russia.

• Further tax increases are inevitable. Even if the fighting in Ukraine comes to an end, Russia will need money for recovery and development. The only question is how big the tax rises will be.

• What Putin’s refusal to comment on events in Venezuela and Iran says about his strategy in Ukraine;

• A survey showing that Russian business sentiment has deteriorated sharply, with weak demand and dissatisfaction over high taxes at record levels.

We also briefly consider the Russian Orthodox Church’s first anti-abortion prayer and why Russian officials prefer not to acknowledge that the war in Ukraine has now lasted longer than the so-called Great Patriotic War (1941-1945).

⏳ This newsletter contains 1738 words—it will take about 9 minutes to read.

Kremlin ready to make geopolitical sacrifices to ‘win’ in Ukraine

Desperate to keep Trump on side to secure a favorable peace deal in Ukraine, Putin is even willing to refrain from criticism of U.S. actions in Venezuela and Iran.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has barely appeared in public since the New Year, and has notably refrained from commenting on two major global events: the capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro by the U.S. military on January 3, and Washington’s threats to launch military action in support of Iranian protestors.

Having ordered the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in response to what he deemed a “U.S.-orchestrated coup” in 2014, Putin now appears remarkably relaxed about Western-led regime change. This is particularly significant because his coyness risks jeopardizing Russia’s relationships with countries in the Global South, where opposition to U.S. military interventions runs deep.

Putin is likely avoiding criticism of his U.S. counterpart Donald Trump because he still hopes Trump will help him conclude a peace deal in Ukraine that is favorable to Russia.

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• The first parliamentary elections since the start of the war

• A possible squeeze on non–oil-and-gas revenue

• The social and political impact of soldiers returning from Ukraine

• The specter of declining living standards

• The risks of implementing Russia’s “great internet firewall”

While the war in Ukraine continues, the Kremlin will carry on pretending life in Russia is “normal”—while simultaneously cracking down on dissent, tightening censorship, and squeezing every last drop out of the economy to achieve victory on the battlefield.

However, the war has become so all-consuming that a peace deal would also be a political challenge. In post-war Russia, there will be a reckoning with the enormous costs of the fighting (human and economic), as well as a search for new political messaging, and existential questions about how to generate economic growth.

The five key issues we predict will define Russia in 2026 could all be affected by an end to the fighting—but it will not diminish their importance.

⏳ This newsletter contains 1450 words—it will take about 8 minutes to read.

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📌 First parliamentary elections since the start of the war

Why does it matter? Over the last two decades, Russian President Vladimir Putin has done everything in his power to turn elections into a ritualized, purely technical procedure—from the widespread use of ballot-stuffing and fraud, to total control of the media. But the Kremlin needs to preserve a constitutional majority for the ruling United Russia party in order to be able to pass the laws it needs, and elections remain an important part of how the regime sees itself. In the run-up to the vote, the Kremlin will want to avoid angering the elite and the wider public. As a consequence, election periods tend to be a nervous time.

Wartime or peacetime? The most important consideration for the Kremlin is whether the elections—scheduled for September 2026—will be held while the fighting continues in Ukraine. In many ways, it would be more straightforward to hold wartime elections because the Kremlin already has the experience of the 2024 presidential elections.

Indeed, if a peace deal were reached in the coming months, it would make voting more unpredictable. The Kremlin’s political managers would have to take account of how exactly the war ended; how supporters of the war reacted to the arrival of peace; the impact of the return of hundreds of thousands of men from the front; and the economic situation. It’s possible the Kremlin’s concerns about their ability to “control” elections explains the online restrictions imposed this year, and repression targeting activists that pose no political threat.

📌 Squeeze on non–oil-and-gas revenue

Why does it matter? The idea that the Kremlin is solely dependent on money from oil and gas exports is a myth. As much as 78 percent of Russia’s budget actually consists of taxes, duties, and other revenue streams formally unrelated to oil and gas extraction (and this percentage has been rising). If non–oil-and-gas revenues were lower than projected next year because of anemic economic growth, it could influence policymaking—perhaps even pushing Putin toward ending the war in Ukraine.

Although Russian military spending remains at a record high, a lack of money could have serious consequences. Defense Minister Andrei Belousov recently complained his agency was operating amid “acute financial restrictions dictated by the federal budget.”

What are the risks? When drafting this year’s budget, the authorities projected 31.4 trillion rubles ($340 billion) in non–oil-and-gas revenues—almost 10 percent more than last year. This was a bold move given that the economy is expected to struggle. Even according to the official GDP forecast, growth will not exceed 1.3 percent, and estimates by most independent economists are under 1 percent. The government is hoping growth in non–oil-and-gas revenues will be delivered by additional VAT income (VAT was raised from 20 percent to 22 percent on January 1). However, it’s an open question whether this will generate enough money. Apart from anything else, the increased tax burden, and high interest rates, could push thousands of businesses into the shadow economy.

📌 Soldiers returning from Ukraine

Why does it matter? About 700,000 soldiers are currently fighting in Ukraine, according to official data. Whether they return all at once after a peace deal, or gradually, the consequences will be significant. Since the full-scale invasion in 2022, there have been at least 1,000 cases in which Russian soldiers have killed, or attempted to kill, Russian civilians far behind the frontlines.

What to expect? State-owned media do not devote any airtime to the crimes committed by veterans. Instead, Russian propaganda—and Russian officials—refer to them as “heroes,” and glorify their exploits. Putin calls them a “new elite.” In private conversations, however, officials have previously conceded to Faridaily that these are badly traumatised men, who are accustomed to violence, and prone to PTSD and alcohol abuse.

The first to suffer from the violence committed by ex-soldiers will almost certainly be their families, especially their wives. But there will also be conflicts with civilians—particularly those who did not fight.

Soldiers who enjoyed the enormous salaries and bonuses given to those who volunteered to fight may also be unwilling to settle for low-paid jobs when they return to civilian life. According to officials, 250,000 already-returned soldiers are unemployed. And a source in a government-affiliated analytical center said ex-soldiers might quickly end up in debt—making their existence even more precarious.

📌 Declining living standards

Why does it matter? Russia’s wartime consumer boom has come to an end. For the first two years of fighting, this helped the Kremlin maintain the illusion that the war was far away, and was having little effect on everyday life. But the illusion began to fade last year, and this process will continue to unfold in 2026.

What is happening to consumer demand? The boom of 2023–2024 was driven by rising household incomes, fueled by expanding social handouts (not only to the military and their families, but also, for example, to families with children), and, most importantly, by strong wage growth. However, wage growth slowed significantly in 2025. From January through October, Russian wages grew 4.7 percent year-on-year in real terms (compared to 9 percent in 2024).

Ongoing labor shortages mean modest wage growth will likely still be the norm in 2026. At the same time, high borrowing costs and weakening consumer confidence are already weighing heavily on consumer demand. Retail trade growth fell from 7.2 percent in 2024 to just 2.5 percent in 2025.

A gradual fall in living standards is extremely unlikely to have any dramatic political consequences. However, it could fuel unhappiness over the long-term. With an economy heading for stagnation, it will become harder and harder for the Kremlin to find the resources to manage this discontent.

📌 Implementing Russia’s ‘great internet firewall’

Why does it matter? The Kremlin carried out an unprecedented assault on internet freedoms last year and—if things continue—Russians may soon find themselves completely cut off from independent information, and communication with the outside world.

What happened in 2025? Russia effectively blocked WhatsApp, the country’s most popular messaging app; video sharing platform YouTube; and voice calls on Telegram, Russia’s second most popular messenger. At the same time, it pushed “national messenger” MAX as a replacement, including via laws mandating its use. In addition, many regions have had no mobile internet for six months—internet shutdowns in Russia last year broke all global records. In December, Putin claimed that Russia had “achieved full digital sovereignty.”

What will happen in 2026? There are no signs the online crackdown has come to an end—and some of the Kremlin’s plans for this year are already clear. Parliament is set to approve laws requiring Russians to register the International Mobile Equipment Identifiers (IMEIs) of their devices in a special database, allowing telecom operators to block “suspicious” devices. It will also be made illegal to receive calls from foreign numbers.

However, there is far from universal support for these restrictions. Even state-controlled pollster VTsIOM has said 39% of Russians do not support blocking foreign internet services. And this rises to 68% of those aged between 25 and 33. This has led to some small protests (for example, one in the Siberian city of Tomsk in December last year, shown above), and it’s possible that the discontent may play a role in the September parliamentary elections.

In 2025, Russia saw an extraordinary event—the suicide of a government minister. We spoke to our high-level sources to gauge their response.

Russia’s unprecedented internet crackdown goes far beyond censorship, threatening access to basic online services and driving a dramatic—and likely permanent—process of de-digitalization.

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• Why Putin dresses more and more often in military uniform, and why he has taken to being seen at more military-themed meetings;

• The reasons for the ruble’s strength this year. Can it last?

We also briefly look at new data on Russian military spending, a rare street protest against the Orthodox Church, and the first foreign company to be designated “extremist.”

This newsletter contains 2114 words—it will take about 10 minutes to read.

Putin’s increasingly frequent military PR-stunts

The “militarization” of Putin’s media activity is supposed to bolster his image as a wartime leader and convince the White House that Russia is winning on the battlefield.

There has been a significant uptick in the number of public meetings about the Ukraine war involving President Vladimir Putin over the last three months, according to a tally by Faridaily. The Russian leader has also been seen far more often in military uniform.

Putin held two such meetings about the war in October (1, 2), one in November (3), and two so far this month (4, 5)—a total of five. In comparison, he had just four such meetings in the entire first two years of the war (2022 and 2023). Similarly, in the same October-December period, Putin appeared in public wearing a military uniform three times. Until the beginning of this year, he had only ever been seen in civilian clothes.

Being shown as more directly involved in the military effort is a tactic supposed to bolster Putin’s image as a successful commander-in-chief, and broadcast confidence that Russia is winning the war. And this is designed to strengthen the Kremlin’s negotiating position in ongoing peace talks. Above all, Putin seems to want to influence the thinking of U.S. President Donald Trump and his administration, which has stepped up its efforts to find a peace agreement acceptable to all sides of the conflict. The Kremlin wants to try and convince Washington that Ukraine’s capitulation on the battlefield is inevitable—so, Moscow should be allowed to dictate its terms for ending the war.

Unlike his Ukrainian counterpart, Volodymyr Zelensky, whose sartorial choices changed after the full-scale invasion and is regularly seen in military attire, Putin has generally preferred to remain in a suit. The first time Putin donned a military uniform was in March, 2025, at a meeting when his generals informed him Russian forces were about to retake parts of Kursk region seized by Ukraine. This was also shortly after Trump’s return to the White House, and before one of the first visits to Moscow by U.S. special envoy Steve Witkoff.

At least circumstantially, there is evidence that Putin’s military outfits coincide with key moments in peace negotiations with Washington. He again put on a military uniform in November when details of Trump’s new peace plan were revealed. And in December a day before the Moscow visit by Witkoff and with Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner.

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