Hello and welcome to a special edition of our newsletter that looks at Russia’s 2026 budget—the key to understanding the government’s financial priorities. How is Russia balancing the needs of the war in Ukraine with ensuring macroeconomic stability?
As in other years since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, this year’s budget, which was submitted to parliament on Monday, allocates huge sums to the military. But it also revealed the Finance Ministry has made a big effort to curb spending. Indeed, for the first time since 2022, spending next year will be almost unchanged compared to what was planned in 2024 (see table). It’s true that, on paper at least, year-on-year spending in 2026 is supposed to increase by 4 percent. However, given the government’s inflation target is 4 percent (and inflation is currently about 8 percent), real-term spending next year will flatline, or fall. This is a significant shift after years of rising spending driven by the need to finance the war.
The government’s revenue forecast was similarly cautious, with predictions scaled back due to lower oil prices and sluggish economic growth. To maintain revenue, it was announced last week that the government will raise VAT by 2 percentage points, eliminate tax breaks for small and medium-sized businesses, and increase other taxes. As the tax burden on the non-commodity sector of the Russian economy grows, the share of revenue from oil-and-gas in the budget is set to reach a record low of just 22 percent.
The new budget envisages a deficit of 1.6% of GDP in 2026, which is 20 percent lower than the average between 2022 and 2024—and significantly less than the Finance Ministry expects for this year. The Ministry plans to withdraw under 40 billion rubles ($470 million) from Russia’s National Wealth Fund (NWF) next year to plug the deficit. This symbolic amount reflects formal compliance with Russia’s so-called “budget rules.” In other words, the deficit will be almost entirely financed through increased borrowing. The Finance Ministry plans to raise about 4 trillion rubles, primarily on the domestic market, with total public debt by the end of next year not exceeding an (uncontroversial) 19% of GDP.
Of course, these are just plans. Since the war began, Russia has not once managed to stay within its spending targets laid out in the budget. The gulf between planning and reality was particularly significant this year: revenue fell short because of overly optimistic forecasts for oil prices and economic growth, while spending has increased. As a result, the budget deficit for this year is expected to hit 2.6% of GDP—the highest level since the pandemic year of 2020 (when it was 3.8% of GDP). Of course, the main reasons for over-spending have been the needs of the military, and helping the economy cope with Western sanctions.
One of the most important factors when it comes to whether Russia can balance its budget is the Kremlin’s appetite for war in Ukraine. Despite engaging in peace negotiations, the budget announced this week shows that the Kremlin plans to continue allocating huge sums to the military, police, National Guard, and intelligence agencies. Next year, 38% of all budget spending will go to these organizations—rising to 38.6% in 2027.
Nor is it likely that defense spending will be significantly scaled back in the near future. Even if hostilities cease, the army will still need to replenish its depleted arsenals. The largest spending item in the budget over the next three years remains “National Defense,” which includes both current military spending and investments in new armaments. Next year, 12.9 trillion rubles (about 6 percent of GDP) have been earmarked for “National Defense” (compared to 2.7 percent in 2021, the last pre-war year).
Nevertheless, at least on paper, next year will be the first year since the war began when there will not be a year-on-year increase in spending on “National Defense.” The Finance Ministry even plans to reduce it slightly. However, for two reasons, this should not be overstated. Firstly, the reduction is tiny. Secondly, it is being offset by an increase in spending on “National Security,” an item that also partially funds the war in Ukraine.
Some have argued that military spending as a percentage of GDP is falling—but this is also a claim that should be viewed critically. Economists point out that the Russian authorities inflate nominal GDP forecasts so that the budget appears to be balanced.
As a whole, this year’s budget highlights the growing difficulties facing the Finance Ministry when it comes to balancing fiscal stability with military spending. Up until now, Russia has tackled this problem by redistributing wealth from private businesses and households to the defense sector. One way this occurs is through monetary policy: while the defense sector receives money from the state, or enjoys subsidized interest rates, businesses and households face sky-high borrowing costs due to record interest rates (the Central Bank raised rates to curb inflation caused by… increased state spending). But it is also visible in successive budgets, which have seen the share of non-military spending steadily fall. The latest budget doubles down on this trend: while VAT increase means consumers will have less money in their pockets; the military continues to get enough cash.
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Arithmetic suggests spending on health, education, pensions etc must be falling quite a bit in real terms. Is this showing up in obvious ways?
Also, is the inflation rate understated? I can't see how an 18 per cent interest rate can be sustained for long with 8-10 per cent inflation.