Hello and welcome to your essential guide to Russian politics and economics—written by Farida Rustamova and Margarita Liutova. This time, we start with United States President Donald Trump’s decision Thursday to cancel a planned meeting with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, and impose sanctions on the Russian oil sector.
The U.S. decision to sanction Russian oil majors Lukoil and Rosneft will have “certain consequences” for the economy, admitted Putin. Together, Lukoil and Rosneft account for about 50 percent of Russia’s oil production.
While Putin called the new U.S. sanctions unfriendly, the tone of his remarks suggested he did not want (at least for now) to burn bridges with Washington. He avoided angry words, refrained from criticizing Trump, and said he was ready for further dialogue.
Taxes from oil and gas production account for about 22 percent of Russia’s budget revenues, but they are also the largest source of foreign currency for the economy. Hydrocarbon exports affect both the value of the ruble, and economic activity. However, whether revenues will drop due to the U.S. sanctions remains an open question. Much will depend on whether they are adhered to by major importers of Russian oil (India and China); whether Russian oil companies can find workarounds; and the oil price. The success of the U.S. plan to push Putin toward a compromise with Kyiv, therefore, also depends on these factors. We will cover the impact of U.S. sanctions on the Kremlin’s economic power, as well as how Putin’s inner circle perceive Trump’s change of position, in an upcoming newsletter.
This time, we focus on topics that, at first glance, may seem unrelated. But they are vivid illustrations of how life in Russia has changed since the start of the war:
Momentum gathers behind a nationwide law to restrict the availability of abortions;
Russian motorists protest plans to raise the controversial car scrappage fee.
We also look briefly at the designation of leading opposition figures as “terrorists,” and the Central Bank’s decision to cut interest rates by 0.5 percent.
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Abortion restrictions
Putin’s obsession with Russia’s fertility rate, as well as the growing influence of Orthodox and conservative values in the Kremlin, is likely to lead to anti-abortion legislation.
Russia appears to be moving toward a nationwide law to ban the “coercement” of women into abortions amid Putin’s ongoing fixation on the country’s demographic crisis. Such a law was publicly backed last week by a State Council commission.
“Fertility is his [Putin’s] fetish,” an official who discusses demographic issues with the Russian leader told Faridaily.
As many as 25 Russian regions have introduced such a law over the last two years, but passing it at a national level would mark a significant acceleration in Russia’s lurch toward embracing a pro-life agenda. It would also illustrate—yet again—the growing power of Orthodox, and conservative, groups over policymaking.
What, though, does “coercing” people into abortions mean? In existing regional laws, it’s defined as “actions aimed at compelling a pregnant woman to terminate her pregnancy through persuasion, offers, bribery, or deception.” In practice, it’s used to pressure private clinics (where abortions are quicker and easier to get than in the state system) to stop offering the service. Penalties for violating the existing laws include fines of up to 5,000 rubles ($61) for individuals, and 500,000 rubles for organizations.
Restricting abortions is one of several crude methods being used to combat the country’s demographic crisis—another is payments to teenage mothers, including those who are still in high school. One source close to the government said Putin sees increasing the birth rate as a task of historical significance. Last year, Putin told officials to “start and end their day thinking about fertility.”
The president’s obsession means increasing the fertility rate remains a priority for officials at all levels, who are likely to continue to lobby for measures short of an outright abortion ban: for example, PR campaigns against abortion, banning “childfree propaganda,” introducing (and increasing) fines for “coercing” people into abortions, and pre-abortion counseling.
Fertility rates are even one of the metrics the Kremlin uses to assess governors. “Regions actively exchange practices. Someone bold tries something, others watch: no backlash? Let’s try it too,” said a source close to the governor in one of Russia’s northern regions, describing a surge in fertility-boosting measures.
However, the Kremlin also knows it has to tread carefully when it comes to abortions. Firstly, Russians are opposed to a full ban, according to Kremlin polling described to Faridaily. “This idea [of a full ban] was not supported at the highest level—the president and his administration,” said an official who works on demography policymaking. who suggested the reason was a wariness about the public response. A source in the Ministry of Health confirmed this. “Banning abortions is too risky,” he said, “the population won’t accept it.” Secondly, access to abortion is protected by the Russian constitution, and laws already on the statute books. Attempts to change legislation to ban abortions would attract nationwide attention, with unpredictable consequences.
The campaign for abortion restrictions is led by the Russian Orthodox Church, and influential conservatives (like, for example, tycoon Konstantin Malofeev). Opposing them are officials who are wary of a return to illegal abortions, and the resulting increased mortality. Aware of how divisive the topic can be, Putin rarely addresses the issue in public.
Women are the most vocal opponents of abortion bans, according to a source involved in demographic policymaking. Russian polling agencies, seemingly aware of the Kremlin’s position, publish little data on attitudes toward abortion. However, a December 2023 poll by the Kremlin-aligned FOM agency showed 75 percent of women, and 54 percent of men, oppose an abortion ban. In an October 2024 poll by FOM, when asked, “Which fertility-boosting measures are most effective?” 26 percent said increased state financial support for families (and only 1 percent said banning abortions).
Some officials told Faridaily they had even been chided by relatives for backing controversial pro-fertility measures. “My 75-year-old mother turned up and started telling me off,” said the official working on demographic policymaking. “She said: ‘Don’t meddle in that sort of thing; it’s a woman’s business’.”
Analysis in Brief
Opposition figures accused of terrorism
The Federal Security Service (FSB) last week opened a criminal case against the “Anti-War Committee of Russia” for allegedly attempting to seize power by force, and creating a terrorist organization. The 23-member committee is made-up of exiled Russians who oppose the Kremlin, including tycoon Mikhail Khodorkovsky, politician Vladimir Kara-Murza, and political scientist Ekaterina Schulmann. The FSB said the case was a result of the committee’s declaration calling for an end to the Putin regime, and the creation of a platform for Russian democratic groups at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.
A few days later, Leonid Volkov, one of the leaders of deceased opposition leader Alexei Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation (FBK), said that the Prosecutor General’s Office was seeking to designate the organization a terrorist group. A closed court hearing to determine the issue was set for Nov. 27, Volkov said, adding that, if the request was granted, it would equate the FBK with Al-Qaeda and ISIS in the eyes of Russian law enforcement.
Being designated a “terrorist” makes life harder for Russia’s exiled opposition—as well as even more dangerous for Russians seen supporting them. Even quoting opposition figures labeled as terrorists in a post on social media could soon be interpreted as justifying terrorism, and be punished by up to five years in prison.
Russia cuts interest rates to 16.5%
The Central Bank cut interest rates 0.5 percentage points to 16.5 percent on Friday. The decision disappointed many who had hoped for a more significant cut. In a press release, the Central Bank emphasized it would “maintain monetary conditions as tight as necessary” to achieve low levels of inflation.
The Central Bank’s re-affirmation of its commitment to a tight monetary policy is often interpreted by some as proof of its independence. But this is the wrong way to understand what’s going on. Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, the Central Bank has been charged with managing the economic consequences of massive defense spending, and maintaining an illusion of stability. So far, it has fulfilled this mission. But if the defense industry were to face tough times, the Central Bank would be obliged to comply with direct political orders—and would abandon its monetary commitments.
Car tax protests
The Kremlin is more concerned with raising revenue than it is about public unhappiness over fees that make foreign cars more expensive.
About 500 people protested earlier this month in the Far Eastern city of Vladivostok against government plans to raise taxes on cars—a rare example of economic pain expressing itself in public anger. Placards at the demonstration included those saying: “A car isn’t a mortgage, but a means to get around!” and “I’m a patriot, not an idiot” (pictured below).


Protestors are unhappy about a planned Nov.1 increase in the car scrappage fee, which is applied when cars are imported or registered. The money generated goes to aid the country’s struggling automobile industry. Russia has hiked the scrappage fee significantly in recent years—including nearly doubling it in 2025. This time, however, officials want to change how the tax is calculated so the fee will depend on engine power (the higher the power, the higher the fee). As a result, the tax on some cars will jump significantly. For example, the scrapage fee for a Toyota RAV4 with a 2-liter engine will increase 220-fold to about $8,800. Of course, since the start of the war in Ukraine, Toyota no longer officially supplies Russia, but its cars are imported via third countries in gray-market schemes.
Western sanctions following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine hit Russia’s domestic car industry hard, and the sector is still suffering. New car sales were down 22 percent in the first nine months of 2025 compared to last year. State-owned automobile manufacturer AvtoVAZ recently shifted staff to a four-day working week.
The scrappage fee, introduced in 2012, was designed to fund the infrastructure for recycling old cars. But it has never been used for this purpose. Instead, Russian car factories (including foreign-brand assembly plants) receive subsidies offsetting the fee (effectively exempting them), thus making foreign cars less attractive to Russian buyers due to a higher price, and encouraging foreign manufacturers to invest in Russia.
Imported second-hand cars from Japan or South Korea are especially popular in Vladivostok, and across Russia’s Far Eastern regions, where geographic proximity makes them more competitive on price. Hence, the public anger about the scrappage fee changes. But discontent over the fee hike extends across the country. Regional media, and car news websites, have been openly critical of the decision.
The government offered a limited concession last week: the new rules will take effect a month later than planned. However, a complete climbdown is unlikely. The Finance Ministry expects to get 560 billion rubles in revenue from the scrappage fee next year—enough to cover about 15 percent of the country’s planned budget deficit. And domestic car manufacturers are in desperate need of support. In other words, heading off factory shutdowns and job losses is more important to officials than the risk of public discontent.
Correction: the previous version of this post incorrectly stated that the Central Bank’s Board of Directors’ key rate meeting on Friday, 24th October, was likely to be the last one this year. This year’s last meeting is planned for December 19th. We apologize for the mistake.
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His obsession with fertility is actually a mark of seriousness. If we assume Russia will continue to have its current ambitions and the military will continue to operate the way it does, fertility should be treated with deadly seriousness. Its unfortunate that such a terrible person is treating the fertility crisis with an urgency lacking in most democratic governments. I doubt cracking down on abortion will turn the tide but then again nobody has figured out how to deal with this issue.
I was struck by the decline in Russian domestic car sales, given that European competitors have left and Chinese imports are restricted. What is the role of sanctions here? I read early on in the war that various features had to be stripped out as parts were sanctioned. But three years in, and with no end in sight, you would think that buyers would have little choice but to buy even second-rate cars. My inference (consistent with the high level of interest rates) is that inflation is actually higher than reported, and the purchasing power of wages correspondingly lower.